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SECTION 5(g).OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT, AS
AMENDED BY THE COURT

T

By

EDWARD

F. X\VAITE*

IIS ARTICLE assumes four postulates:

(1) In construing a statute the court's aim should be to declare the law as it is, rather than as it ought to be.
(2) Within constitutional limitations the statute law is what
the legislature intended, if this can be ascertained.
(3) "Words used in a statute are to be read in the natural and
ordinary sense given them by those who use the language with
propriety; the approved popular meaning being given to words of
common speech unless there is reason to believe, from the face of
the statute, that the words were intended to bear some other
meaning."'
(4) Departure from the foregoing principles by a court so
high in our judicial system as a United States Circuit Court of
Appeals is a matter of general and grave concern.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 contains the
following language-Sec. 5(g) :
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require
any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the
land or naval forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Any such person claiming such exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained . . . shall, if he is

inducted into the land or naval forces under this Act, be assigned
to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or shall, if
he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such
noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction, be assigned t(,
work of national importance under civilian direction."
The proper administrative authorities divided registrants into
classes according to the various provisions of the Act. Class I-A
covers those who are subject to no exemption. Class I-A-O includes each registrant "who would have been classified in Class
*Judge of the District Court for the Fourth District, Minnesota, 19111941 (Retired) ; Special Assistant to the Attorney General, designated as
Hearing Officer under Section 5(g) of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.
and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Justice.
'Black, Interpretation of Laws (2d Ed.), 141.
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I-A but for the fact that he has been found, by reason of religious
training and belief, to be conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form and to be conscientiously opposed to combatant
military service in which he might be ordered to take human life,
but not conscientiously opposed to noncombatant military service
in which he could contribute to the health, comfort and preservation of others." Class IV-E covers those who have been found
"by reason of religious training and belief to be conscientiously
opposed to both combatant and non-combatant military service."
In March, 1941, Mathias Kauten was placed by his local
draft board in I-A. The local appeal board confirmed this classification, and he was duly ordered to report for induction. This he
refused to do. He was prosecuted and convicted under Sec. 11 of
the Act for failing to perform a required duty. The case went to
the Circuit Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, and was decided Feb.
8, 1943.* The opinion was by Judge A. N. Hand, sitting with
Judges Clark and Frank. It appeared in the record that the appeal
board had adopted the report and recommendation of the hearing
oifficer who had heard the case in accordance with the administrative machinery set up in the Act, and had recommended "that the
appeal of the registrant based upon grounds of conscientious objections be not sustained." According to this report the registrant
admitted that he was an atheist, or at least an agnostic. In his questionnaire he circled the word "religious" with a notation on the
side: "This isnot my case." "The registrant makes it quite clear,"
says the hearing officer, "that his religious training and belief is
not the basis of his present opposition to war. There is no doubt
that the registrant is sincerely opposed to war but this belief
emanates from personal philosophical conceptions arising out of his
nature and temperament, and which is to some extent political....
It is quite obvious that the registrant's opposition to the present
war is greatly influenced by his dislike of our present administration." The appeal was specifically based upon an error of law of
the appeal board in construing too narrowly the word "religious"
as used in the statute.
After holding that the court could not review the decision of
the local draft board, but that the remedy lay through habeas
corpus after compliance with the order for induction, thus disposing of the case, the court went on to say:
"It seems proper, however, to say that we find no error of law
on the part of the appeal board. The only error suggested ...is
"United States v. Kauten, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir.) 133 F. (2d) 703.
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whether the statute was properly construed in excluding from the
exemption of Section 5 (g) a person having such beliefs as the
defendant expressed ....

In order to avail himself of his privilege

a registrant must establish that his objection to participation in
war is due to 'religious training and belief.' It must ex vi termini
be a general scruple against participation in war in any form, and
not merely an objection to participation in this particular war....
Though the registrant may have been entirely sincere in the ideas
he expressed, his objections to reporting for induction were based
on philosophical and political considerations applicable to this
war rather than on 'religious training and belief.' They, therefore,
were properly overruled, but not because he lacked membership in
any sect or organization whose religious convictions were against
war.. . . We are not convinced by anything in the record that the
registrant did not report for induction because of a compelling
voice of conscience, which we should regard as a religious impulse,
but his declarations and reasoning seem to indicate that he was
moved by convictions, however sincere, of quite a different character ....

It is unnecessary to attempt a definition of religion; the

content of the term is found in the history of the human race and
is incapable of compression into a few words. Religious beliefs
arise from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individual to his fellowmen and to his universe-a sense
common to men in the most primitive and in the most highly
civilized societies. It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be
limited by it. It is belief finding expression in a conscience which
categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary selfinterest and to accept martyrdom in preference to transgressingits
tenets. [Italics supplied.) . . . There is a distinction between a

course of reasoning resulting in a conviction that a particular war
is inexpedient or disastrous and a conscientious objection to participating in any war under any circumstances. The latter, and not
the former, may be the basis of exemption under the Act."
This of course was a clear declaration that even if the court should
regard the case as properly in court-a point which had been
decided in the negative-it would hold that no error of law had
been committed. But the court said further"The former is usually a political objection, while the latter, wve
think, may justly be regarded as a response of the individual to
an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is for many persans at the present time the equivalent of what has always been
thought religious impulse." [Italics supplied.)
Although the italicized language was responsive to an extensive
and ingenious argument in appellant's brief, if it is to be regarded
as a general interpretation of the words "by reason of religious
training and belief" in the Act as adding nothing to "conscientiously," certainly no lawyer reading the whole case can fail to
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raise the question whether it was not merely a dictum. Nothing
was argued in the Government's brief excepting what it insisted
was the only point involved-whether the trial court erred in refusing to accept evidence to show error of law on the part of the
local board or the appeal board. The opinion was hailed by proponents of appellant's view as "significant judicial recognition of religious belief as a matter of personal conscience, not necessarily related to theological or ecclesiastical concepts ;" but the sympathetic
writer added that "Judge Hand, in elaborating his views on religion, went beyond the legal issues before the court." 3 It is referred to, however, by the same court in the case of United States
cx rel. Phillips v. Downer,4 decided May 7, 1943, as an "authoritative interpretation of the Act." The court quotes the italicized
language, and holds that the registrant Phillips, who was before
the court on a writ of habeas corpus, was entitled to exemption.
It accepts his statement that, while he admits he is an agnostic, his
opposition to war is "deep-rooted, based not on political considerations but on a general humanitarian concept which is essentially
religious in character," and the court distinguishes the case from
Kauten as follows: "Here the opposition to war was a deep-rooted
one applying to war in general and was not based upon political
objections to this particular war." "The government does make
a claim that a registrant's opposition to war must be definitely
traceable to some religious belief or training. But if a stricter rule
than that announced in the Kauten Case is called for, one demanding a belief which cannot be found among the philosophers, but
only among religious teachers of recognized organizations, then
we are substantially or nearly back to the requirement of the Act
of 1917, of membership in a well-recognized religious sect or
organization whose existing creed or principles forbid its members
to participate in war in any form." The opinion was by Judge
Clark, sitting with Judges A. N. Hand and Chase. Judge Chase
dissented on grounds which are not relevant to this inquiry.
The same question was again considered in the 2nd Circuit in
United States ex rel. Brandon v. Downer, decided Jan. 7, 1944.
The appeal was from the District Court which had quashed a writ
of habeas corpus. The recital of facts shows that the registrant
Brandon "does not believe in God or in any divine power, but he is
opposed to war and military service because he believes that war
-"The Conscientious Objector, March, 1943.
4(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 521.
-(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1944) 139 F. (2d) 761.
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is morally wrong and 'a denial of the brotherhood of man.'" The
chairman of the local appeal board testified at the trial that one
of the reasons for the rejection of the registrant's claim to exemption was that the board considered that he did not have "a compelling moral conviction against which he cannot act contrary."
The court, while it did not agree with this conclusion, held that it
could not find that the board's decision was arbitrary and capricious, and affirmed the court below. The opinion was by judge L.
Hand, sitting with Judges Chase and Frank. The court said:
"Were it not for the eye examination incident," (the occurrence
on which the local appeal board based its conclusion above quoted)
"we would be obliged to reverse, for in that event appellant would
unquestionably have been a conscientious objector within the statute
as we recently construed it in United States v.Kaitten."
Again the same question was before the same court in United
States er rel. Reel z,.Badt,6 decided April 13, 1944, opinion by
Judge A. N. Hand, sitting with Judges L. Hand and Swan. The
hearing officer, in recommending against the claim for exemption,
reported that the registrant denied any belief in a deity, "except
so far as there may be a moral force in the universe," and was
"a philosophical humanitarian." The court said: "Itis evident
that the hearing officer . . . placed his decision upon the ground

that the relator was not a conscientious objector because his opposition to war was based on humanitarian considerations, and not
on any obligation to a deity or supernatural power. In other words,
he reached a conclusion as a matter of law which was directly
opposed to our decision in United States v.Kauten. There we said
that 'a conscientious objection to participation in any war under
any circumstances . . . may be the basis of exemption under the

Act.' " The court ordered a further hearing before the District
Court, to ascertain whether "the Director of Selective Service ...
adopted the findings of fact of the hearing officer." "If," the court
said, "the District Court shall find that the Director of Selective
Service adopted the findings of fact of the hearing officer or determined that the relator did object to participation in any war under
any circumstances because of the compelling voice of his conscience, the writ should be sustained."
It seems plain that in the cases cited the court declared that
as applied to a sincere objector to participation in any and all
wars the words "by reason of religious training and belief" add
nothing to what is connoted by the word "conscientiously ;" that a
6(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 845.
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scruple properly termed "conscientious" is a "religious" scruple
within the meaning of the Act. That the conscription statute ought
thus to provide, many thoughtful persons agree. They can see
no good reason why a sincere objector on professed philosophical or
humanitarian grounds should be on a different footing from a
sincere objector on grounds professed to arise out of a sense of
obligation to a divine being, when both are backed by willingness to
pay the same price for loyalty to principle. Some of us who wish
this were the law are convinced-regretfully-that it is not. The
writer thinks it will be seririceable to offer some of the reasons for
this conviction.
I. Applying the familar rule for the construction of statutes let
us see whether there is any internal evidence in the Selective
Service Act that the words "religious" and "conscientiously" are
used in other than "their approved popular meaning." In Sec. 5 (d)
exemption is extended to "regular or duly ordained ministers of
religion." Neither the word "religion" nor any of its derivatives
appears elsewhere. Neither "conscience" nor any derivative is
found elsewhere than in Sec. 5(g) ; and surely it will not be claimed
that anything there modifies the popular meaning of the word.
Where the term "conscientious objection" is used by itself, without
qualifying words, there can be no doubt that it refers to the full
definition appearing in the first portion of the sub-section.
II. Perhaps the daily experience of those of us who do not
commonly speak the language of the intelligentsia is a sufficient
guide to the "natural and ordinary sense" of the words in question;
but let us consult the lexicographers. In Webster's New International Dictionary, 1940, we find: "Religion. 1. The service and
adoration of God or a god as expressed in forms of worship, in
obedience to divine commands .

.

. and in the pursuit of a way of

life regarded as incumbent on true believers ;" and I have examined
a sufficient number of authorities to warrant the assertion that
every one in common use gives a primary definition of like import.
"Conscience" is primarily defined as "sense or consciousness of
right and wrong," and I have found no definition which relates it
to belief in a divine or supernatural being. I submit that in common use "conscientious" connotes nothing beyond a fixed and
thoughtful sincerity concerning the moral character of personal
conduct.
No one can read the well known M1lackintosh Case,7 wherein
7
United States v. Macintosh, (1931) 283 U. S. 605, 51 S. Ct. 570, 75
L. Ed. 1302, reversing (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 845.
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both opinions involved discussion of the American attitude toward
religion, and specifically as evidenced by exemptions in draft laws,
without seeing plainly that each group of justices used the term
"conscientious objector" as covering only those who objected to
military service on grounds of religion as defined by the Chief
Justice in his dissenting opinion (in which Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone concurred), namely that "The essence of religion
is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relationship." The dissent quoted the
following from the opinion of Justice Field in Davis v. Beason.
"The essence of religion has reference to one's view of his relations to the Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence
for his being and character, and of obedience to his will." In the
majority opinion by Justice Sutherland it is said: "We are a
Christian people (Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U. S.457, 470, 471, 36 L. Ed. 227, 231, 232, 12 S. Ct. 511)
. . .acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the
will of God." In the parallel case of Bland v. United States," decided the same day as the Mackhintosh Case in the court below and
by the same judges, the case was distinguished from United States
v. Schwhnmer'0 as follows: "The question of whether religious
conviction would be an acceptable excuse from aliens refusing to
agree to bear arms in defense of the United States did not arise.
Counsel for the Government stated expressly that . . . 'the re-

spondent has no religion.' In that case the applicant had a conscientious objection, possessed of pacifistic ideas with propagandist
proclivities and of cosmic anti-nationalistic desires and purposes."
In Reynolds v. United States," discussing the constitutional questions involved in the conviction of a Mormon under an indictment
for bigamy, the court said: "The word 'religion' is not defined in
the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its
meaning, and nowhere, we think, more appropriately than to the
history of the times in the midst of which the provision was
adopted." And in the historical review which follows, Thomas
Jefferson is quoted thus: "Believing with you that religion is
a matter which lies solely between man and his God; that he owes
account to none other for his faith or his worship," etc.,.... "Coming as this does," the court continues, "from an acknowledged
8(1890) 133 U. S. 333, 10 S. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637.
9(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 842.
10(1929) 279 U. S. 644, 49 S. Ct. 448, 73 L. Ed. 889.
1(1879) 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244.

SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

leader of the advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost
as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the
amendment thus secured."
These quotations from the courts are not presented, of course,
as direct authority for any particular interpretation of the Selective
Service Act, since the distinctions here involved were not in any
instance before the court; but they are useful as showing what the
words we are considering meant to these courts when the opinions
were written.
III. The "C. 0." is no new phenomenon in American life. He
was known before the adoption of the Constitution. The Circuit
Court in the Mackintosh Case refers to numerous colonial statutes,
ranging from 1777 to 1782, and to the constitutions of 22 states,
1819 to 1898, in which there has been "a recognition of the right
of a citizen to be excused from military service based on conscientious religious scruples."' ' Justice Cardozo, in Hamilton v.
University of California,"' adds to this list the Constitution of
Idaho and a Colonial law of New York in 1755. I have not
thought it necessary to verify these references nor to pursue the
inquiry with a view to extending the lists. Some of the constitutions and many of the statutes cited have been amended, often in
the direction of increased liberality.
Turning to national legislation, we find that the Act of May 8,
1792, providing for a national militia, exempted those who were
exempted by the laws of the respective states. 14 There were several
such state exemptions, all on definite religious grounds.' 5 I find no
1On July 18, 1775, the Continental Congress passed the following reso-

lution: "As there are some people who, from religious principles, cannot
bear arms in any case, this Congress intends no violence to their consciences,
but earnestly recommend to them to contribute liberally in this time of
universal calamity to the relief of their distressed brethren in the several
colonies, and to do all other services to their oppressed country which they
can consistently with their religious principles." Journals of Congress (17741788) Vol. I, p. 119.
"3(1934) 293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197, 79 L. Ed. 343.
-1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 1st Sess., 2nd Congress, Chapter 33, Sec. 2.
"rOn June 8, 1798, James Madison proposed in the House of Representatives some additional clauses for insertion in Sec. 9, Art. I of the New Constitution. Among them was the following: "The right of the People to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed, a well armed and well regulated
militia being the best security for a free country; but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render service in the
militia." Gales' Annals of Congress, Vol. 1, 434. In the debate which followed (Ib., 749-751, 766-776, 1818, 1821-1828) it appears plainly that the
exemption was proposed and understood merely as recognizing the scruples
of certain religious sects, especially the Quakers. It was finally decided
(Ib. 1827) to leave the matter of exemptions to the states, and only Art. II
of the Bill of Rights survived the discussion.
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later exemptions based on scruples of any sort, in any one of the
compulsory service acts prior to 1864. In that year it was enacted 0 that "members of religious denominations, who shall on
oath or affirmation declare that they are conscientiously opposed
to the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so
by the rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious
denominations, shall, when drafted into military service, be considered noncombatants," and shall be assigned to special duty or
pay a fine.'- The Act of January 2, 1903, to promote the efficiency
of the militia, provided," that "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require or compel any member of any well recognized
religious sect or organization at present organized and existing
whose creed forbids its members to participate in war in any form,
and whose religious convictions are against war or participation
therein in accordance with the creed of said religious organization, to serve in the militia or any other armed or volunteer force
under the jurisdiction and authority of the United States." In
Ch. 134, Sec. 59 of the Act of June 3, 1916,10 providing for compulsory service in the National Guard, Naval Militia and Unorganized Militia, we find the following: "All persons who because
of religious belief shall claim exemption from military service, if
the conscientious holding-of such belief shall be established under
such regulations as the President shall prescribe, shall be exempted from militia service in a combatant capacity; but no person so exempted shall be exempt from militia service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant." The Act
of May 18, 1917,20 in force during the First World war, provides
that "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require
or compel any person to be subject to training or service in a
combatant capacity in the land and naval forces of the United
States who is found to be a member of any well recognized religious sect whose creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form, if the conscientious holding of such
belief by such person shall be established under such regulations
as the President may prescribe; but no such person shall be re1613 U. S. Stats. at Large, 28th Congress, Chapter 13, Sec. 17.
1TIn 1862 the Confederate Congress specifically exempted (on the
furnishing of a substitute or payment of fine) Friends, Dunkards, Nazarenes,
and Mennonites. (Wright, Conscientious Objectors in the Civil War, p. 104).
1832 U. S. Stats. at Large, 2nd Session, 57th Congress, Chapter 196,
sec. 2.
1939 U. S. Stats. at Large, 1st Session, 64th Congress.
2040 U. S. Stats. at Large, 1st Session, 65th Congress, Chapter 15,
Sec. 4.
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lieved from training or service in such capacity as the President
may declare to be noncombatant."
IV. From the foregoing review it seems clear that in colonial
and federal draft laws, and in some state constitutions and statutes, prior to 1940, exemptions on the ground of conscientious
scruples were granted only to those who claimed them to be religious in the ordinary use of that word. Did Congress intend to
change this long established policy by Sec. 5(g) of the Selective
Service Act of Sept. 16, 1940?21
The original Burke-Wadsworth bill 22 had its exemption clause,
Par. 7 (d), in the precise words of the Act of May 18, 1917,
including only members of the so-called pacifist sects,23 and excusing no objectors from noncombatant service. The bill became the
subject of vigorous attack, and both it and its successor, the
present law, were discussed at numerous public hearings before
the House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs. The official
reports of these hearings cover nearly 1000 pages. 24 The writer
will not pretend to have read them all, but he has examined them
with sufficient care to be quite sure that the following statements
are correct.
Many persons representing pacifist organizations, religious
groups, and the army and the navy, appeared with criticisms and
suggestions for amendments. While the principle and present
necessity of compulsory military service were the chief points of
attack, various details, including the restricted terms of exemption in the original House bill, and retention for noncombatant
service were criticized. Throughout the discussion there was no
suggestion, either by members of the respective committees or by
those who appeared for hearing, that the language of the bill as
amended and passed included such persons as were declared in
the Kauten Case to be conscientious objectors "by reason of religious training and belief." Repeated appeals were made for still
broader terms, but without avail.
The history of the original Sec. 7 (d), later 5(g), seems of
sufficient importance to examine it somewhat in detail. The firsi
positive suggestion made at the hearings for enlargement of the
U. S. Stats. at Large, p. 889.
"-H.R. 10132; S. 4164.
1-3In the First World War 13 such sects were recognized, of which the
chief were the Society of Friends, Church of the Brethren, and Mennonites.
(First
2 Report of the Director of Selective Service, pp. 188, 189.
'IIearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, H.R. 76th Congress, 3rd Session, on H.R. 10132, and before the Senate Committee on
Military Affairs on S. 4164.
2154
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exemption was to cover an objector "who individually has religious scruples against the bearing of arms." 2 The present Sec.
5
(g), with variations as to administrative details, was suggested
July 25 by two representatives of the Society of Friends after
conferring with a representative of the Army, and was evidently
a compromise. The objectives were said to be to remedy "three
difficulties and limitations in the present wording of the BurkeWadsworth bill. .

.

. In the first place, consideration there is on

the basis of membership in a well-organized religious sect. Well,
that would benefit the Quakers, but we do not believe they have
any right of preferential treatment. We want the consideration on
the basis of conscience rather than on the basis of membership.
Second, there is no provision for exemption from noncombatant
service in the present Burke-Wadsworth bill. That is the main
objection to it as it is worded in 7 (d)." 2 (The third point had
to do with administration and is not relevant here.) The suggestion evidently met with favor, for it was incorporated in a substitute bill submitted to the Senate Aug. 5 by the Committee on
Military Affairs..2 7 This bill was accompanied with majority and
minority reports. The minority report contained no reference to
conscientious objectors; the majority report only the following:
"The measure is fair to the person holding conscientious scruples
against war and to the Nation of which he is a part. It provides for
inquiry and hearing by the Department of Justice to make recommendations as to whether a person claiming deferment because
of conscientious objections to war is or is not a bona fide conscientious objector. If his contention is made in good faith he may
not be selected for combat service, but may be selected either for
noncombatant service or for national work under civilian direction."2S

It was objected at the hearings that the bill "made no provision
for other than religious objectors," and argued that there ought to
be exemption for those who are "nonreligious," in line with the
British law..2 9 A representative of the American Civil Liberties
Union proposed an amendment which omitted the word "religious" and extended exemption to all persons "conscientiously
25
House
26
House
2

Hearings, p.
Hearings, p.
7Cong. Record, Vol.
8
2 Senate Report, No.

152.
208.
86, p. 9824.
202, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, IV Sen. Miscel-

laneous
Reports, Cal. No. 2110.
29

House Hearings, pp. 185, 186, 189.
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opposed to war in any form." 30 This was supported by a representative of the Mennonite Church.3 A representative of the
War Resisters League, commenting on the Senate bill, said: "Despite the relative liberality of the Senate conscription bill, in respect to conscientious objectors, it is not as broad in its exemptions as the British National Service Act of 1939. The latter includes all conscientious objectors, regardless of whether their
scruples are based on religious belief or simply on humanitarian
considerations. .

.

. The British have set us a good example by

recognizing the fact that conscientious objections to war do not
invariably spring from religious beliefs. 3' 2 On the same day the
precise point now under consideration was presented by a representative of the Committee on World Peace of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, Baltimore Conference, as follows: "The bill
should make adequate provision for all genuinely conscientious
objectors to military training and service, whether their objection
springs from religious, ethical or philosophical grounds. To this
end we recommend amending Sec. 7, paragraph (d), by deleting
the words 'by reason of religious training and belief' so that exemption would be extended to 'any person . . . who . . . is con-

scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form,' and
is found under the terms of the bill to be a bona fide objector." 33
Neither this nor any like change was recommended by either Committee. Can it be doubted that the omission was deliberate?
In the prolonged discussion of the substitute bill in both houses
there was only a single reference to conscientious objectors, and
that was brief and inconsequential. 34V. It seems appropriate to note how the Act has been construed by friends of a more liberal law. A contributor to The
Christian Century of July 15, 1942 said: "Assuming, however,
that the mature conscience is rational, why should not the state
grant a fuller recognition of conscience? . . . The Selective Serv-

ice Act of 1940 offers exemption to any person who 'by reason
of religious training and belief is conscientiously opposed to par-*
3

"House Hearings, p. 191.
"'House Hearings, p. 197.
Since the preparation of this article there has come to the attention
of the writer Exhibit B of a reply of the Secretary of War and the Director
of Selective Service to a Memorandum submitted to the President in
March, 1944, by a committee organized by the American Civil Liberties
Union. The Exhibit presents a full and illuminating series of quotations
from both Senate and House Hearings, all in line with those cited herein.
2
-1
House Hearings, p. 457.
:'3House Hearings, p. 463.
3
' 4Cong. Record, Vol. 86, p. 10106.
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ticipation in war in any form.' This implies that only religious
persons have consciences and that their consciences operate on the
principle of 'all or none.' Non-absolutists who would want to
distinguish between a just and an unjust war would have no recognition under the present law, and neither would one whose objections come from moral, humanitarian or political grounds." In
September 1943, a group of citizens, many of whom are of such
national distinction that their names carry weight3 5 issued "A
Report on the Treatment of Conscientious Objectors in World
War II." After commenting on the conservative attitude of Congress in its reception of proposals to liberalize the original bill,
they say:
"Thus the category of conscientious objectors, while not re-

quiring membership in a religious sect opposed to war, was reserved
to those whose religious training and beliefs led them to oppose
participation in all wars, and excluded by interpretation in practice those equally conscientious whose objections to participation in all wars were based on humanitarian, philosophical, and
-in its widest sense-political grounds. The religious agencies
from the first understood that no such distinction could be fairly
made, when they urged the broad ground of conscience. The justice of their position has been abundantly proved by the hundreds
of cases of men of conscience, denied recognition under illiberal
interpretations of the narrow terms of the law, who have inevitably chosen prison rather than yield their principles."
Where shall we find, in any authoritative quarter, a more
liberal statement of the province of the court in the interpretation
of a statute than the following:
"It is true that codes and statutes do not render the judge
superfluous, nor his work perfunctory and mechanical. There are
gaps to be filled. There are doubts and ambiguities to be cleared.
There are hardships and wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided.
Interpretation is often spoken of as if it were nothing but the
search and the discovery of a meaning which, however obscure
and latent, had none the less a real and ascertainable pre-existence
in the legislator's mind. The process is, indeed, that at times, but
it is often something more. The ascertainment of intention may be
the least of a judge's troubles in ascribing meaning to a statute.
'The fact is,' says Gray in his lecture on the Nature and Sources
of the Lav, Sec. 370, p. 175, 'that the difficulties of so called interpretation arise when the legislature has had no meaning at
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all; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is, not to determine
what the legislature did mean on a point which was present in its
mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not
present to its mind, if the point had been present.' "36
In the light of the foregoing historical and contemporary facts,
can it be claimed that the interpretation of Sec. 5(g) in the 2nd
Circuit is warranted by any sound criterion? Surely "religion"
in the Selective Service Act of 1940 means what it meant in the
Constitution, and what it has meant in common speech and in
colonial, state and federal laws for more than 150 years.
But someone may say--"Even if a Senator or Representative
who voted for the Selective Service Act of 1940 wouldn't recognize it as it has come from the court room of the 2nd Circuit,
what of it? The Act will expire in a few months, and in the mean
time the draft law can be more easily administered so as to
avoid unjust discriminations. Why not ?" Well, answers will differ,
perhaps according to one's convictions as to the function and limitations of the judicial office.
'"Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, pp. 14, 15.

